Dederichs and Weber [4] define what it means for a property to be a liveness property with respect to a safety property. They argue that specifications should be written in the form P ∩ Q, where Q is a liveness property with respect to the safety property P . They also criticize Alpern and Schneider's general definitions of safety and liveness [2]:
We disagree with Dederichs and Weber's contention that non-machineclosed specifications should be avoided. We believe that it is neither desirable nor possible to do so.
Abadi and Lamport's completeness result [1] requires that only the lowerlevel implementation be machine closed, suggesting that there is no need for high-level specifications to be machine closed. Indeed, the general specification of serializability given by Lamport [5] achieves its simplicity by not being machine closed.
Even if one tried to forbid non-machine-closed specifications, they would arise in proofs that one specification implements another. A state-based proof that a lower-level specification Z implements a higher-level specification X is usually done in two steps. One first adds history and prophecy variables to Z to obtain an equivalent specification Y [1] , and then one proves Y ⇒ X, where X is obtained from X by substituting concrete realizations for abstract variables [5] . Surprisingly, it turns out that each of these steps can destroy machine-closure, so Y and X need not be machineclosed even if Z and X are. Although there are alternatives to using history and prophecy variables, substitution of concrete entities for abstract ones is fundamental, and it is likely that non-machine-closed specifications will arise in any approach that handles liveness.
As Dederichs and Weber observe, arbitrary liveness properties are "problematic". However, the problem lies in the nature of liveness, not in its definition.
One cannot avoid complexity by definition.
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